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This paper estimates the impacts of world agricultural 
trade liberalization on wages, employment and 
unemployment in Argentina, a country with positive net 
agricultural exports and high unemployment rates. In the 
estimation of these wage and unemployment responses, 
the empirical model allows for individual labor supply 
responses and for adjustment costs in labor demand. 
The findings show that a 10 percent increase in the price 
of agricultural exports would cause an increase in the 
Argentine employment probability of 1.36 percentage 
points, matched by a decline in the unemployment 
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probability of 0.75 percentage points and an increase in 
labor market participation of 0.61 percentage points. 
Further, the unemployment rate would decline by 1.23 
percentage points (by almost 10 percent). Expected wages 
would increase by 10.3 percent, an effect that is mostly 
driven by higher employment probabilities. This indicates 
that the bulk of the impacts of trade reforms originates 
in household responses in the presence of adjustment 
costs, and that failure to account for them may lead to 
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Agricultural policies in developed countries, such as tariﬀ protection, non-tariﬀ barriers,
export subsidies, and income support policies, are likely to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on poverty
in the developing world. In low-income countries, for example, agricultural policies that aﬀect
the international prices of major cash crops will have impacts on income, crop choices, and
consumption. In contrast, middle-income countries with a more developed industrial sector
will most likely be aﬀected through labor markets via prices in the agro-industrial sector.
More concretely, changes in agro-manufactured export prices will induce a reallocation of
factors of production, changes in relative factor demands, and changes in relative factor prices
(wages). If there are frictions in the economy and wages are not fully ﬂexible, there may be
changes in unemployment as well: employed workers may lose their jobs, unemployed workers
may become employed, and inactive workers may enter the workforce. These changes in the
employment status of individual workers may comprise discrete changes in labor income and
thus in household welfare.
There is a vast literature that has studied farm responses to trade in low-income
countries.1 There is also a vast literature that has looked at labor markets and wages.2 Fewer
papers, however, have investigated the link between trade and labor market responses with
adjustment costs, endogenous labor supply, and unemployment.3 While most research on this
topic has focused on developed countries, my main objective here is to provide evidence on
labor market adjustment to trade shocks in middle-income developing countries.4 I explore
the case of Argentina, a country well-endowed in natural resources and with a comparative
advantage in agro-manufacturing—the major export sector. In addition, the unemployment
1rate in Argentina during the last decade was always greater than 10 percent, making this
experience a great case study to investigate the impacts of agro-manufactured exports in the
presence of adjustment costs in labor markets.
I set up a maximum likelihood model of trade, wages and unemployment. Based on their
market and reservation wages, workers decide whether to be active (i.e., to participate in
the labor market) or inactive. Firms make job oﬀers to active workers; workers who receive
an oﬀer are employed and those who do not become unemployed. Thus, there are three
regression functions in my model: a wage equation, a reservation wage equation, and a job
oﬀer equation.
I capture the role of trade with the international price of agro-manufactured exports
and I make both wages and job oﬀers a function of these prices. To estimate the model, I
combine labor force data on wages, employment, and unemployment at an individual level
with export and import price data at an aggregate level. The method takes advantage of
the time variability in prices and the time variability of household surveys to identify the
parameters of the model. Similar methods have been utilized by Deaton (1997), Goldberg
and Tracy (2003), Porto (2006), Ravallion (1990), and Wolak (1996).
The maximum likelihood model estimates parameters that measure how market wages,
reservation wages, and job oﬀers react to a change in the prices of agro-manufactured exports.
These parameter estimates can be used to predict the probability of actively participating in
the labor market, the probability of getting a job oﬀer, and the probability of employment
and unemployment. In addition, the estimated regression function for wages can be used
to predict expected wages. Armed with these estimates, I investigate the impacts of higher
2export prices of agro-industrial products, possibly due to episodes of trade liberalization in
the developed world.
My results indicate that Argentina would signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from higher prices
of agro-manufactured exports. These higher prices would trigger job openings, raise
employment probabilities and raise wages. By increasing the market wage relative to the
reservation wage, labor market participation would increase as well. In the end, following
a 10 percent increase in the price of agro-manufactured exports, I estimate an increase in
the employment probability of 1.36 percentage points, on average. The unemployment rate
would decline by 1.23 percentage points, which is roughly equivalent to 10 percent of the
Argentine unemployment rate in 1998. Expected wages would increase by 10.39 percent due
to higher market wages, on the one hand, and higher employment probabilities, on the other.
A key ﬁnding is that the increase in employment opportunities accounts for more than 70
percent of the increase in expected wages. These results thus highlight the importance of
allowing for labor market adjustments to trade reforms in empirical work and suggest that
failure to account for these adjustment eﬀects will bias the estimates of the welfare impacts
of trade policy.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe and estimate the
empirical model, and I discuss the results. In section 3, I investigate the impacts of higher
prices of agro-manufactured exports on wages, employment and unemployment in Argentina.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
32 A Model of Trade, Wages and Unemployment
International trade cannot by itself be the cause of unemployment, which instead arises
when there are frictions in the economy. Models of unemployment typically include
minimum wages, eﬃciency wages, search costs and matching, and credit and liquidity
constraints. Theoretical models of trade and unemployment with minimum wages include
Brecher (1974) and Davis (1996). Albert and Meckl (2001) study trade in the presence
of eﬃciency-wage unemployment. Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) explore instead
trade and search-generated unemployment. Finally, Leamer (1980) and Baldwin, Mutti, and
Richardson (1980) introduce models of unemployment generated during the transition that
follows a trade reform when there are costs of adjustment.
In all these scenarios, trade can interact with the inherent frictions in the economy to
exacerbate the incidence of trade costs or to boost the gains from trade. For example,
when new export opportunities arise, unemployed individuals may become employed in the
export sector, thus signiﬁcantly beneﬁting from trade. In contrast, frictions may prevent the
absorption of job losses in the import competing sectors in the face of stronger competition
from abroad. If there are labor supply responses, additional eﬀects will arise in equilibrium
because the conditions in international markets can aﬀect total labor supply and equilibrium
unemployment.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the mechanisms. The graph depicts a simple two-sector
(a and m) speciﬁc factor model (land and capital, for instance). Labor is mobile across
sectors. The length of the box measures the total labor supply, and the downward sloping
curves represent labor demand (the value of its marginal productivity): V pa is the labor
4demand in the export sector (say, agro-manufactures) and V pm, the labor demand in the
m sector. Because of the frictions mentioned above, the equilibrium wage w is above
the competitive wage so that the labor market does not clear completely and there is
unemployment, U = L(pa,pm) − La − Lm.6
In Figure 1, the impacts of trade can be assessed by considering an increase in the price
of agro-manufactured exports, pa. Although I do not model the price changes explicitly,
export prices for Argentine products like dairy, oils and fats, mills products and beef—goods
that form the bulk of manufactured exports of the country—may increase due to trade
liberalization in developed countries. These countries intervene in world markets with an
extensive set of tariﬀs, non-tariﬀ barriers, and subsidies and it is feasible to think that the
elimination of (some of) these barriers will bring about increases in export prices. The
increase in pa raises labor demand in the agro-industrial sector. This is captured by an
outward shift in the demand curve to V p0
a. In addition, there may be a change in the market
wage, say to w0. Finally, there may a change in total labor supply, say to L0. The impacts
of a higher pa on unemployment is thus ambiguous. The initial shift in labor demand tends
to reduce unemployment, but higher wages cause ﬁrms to move backwards along the labor
demand curves, thus reducing employment. Finally, higher wages lead to more participation
and higher unemployment (ceteris paribus).
In the remainder of this section, I develop an empirical model of trade, unemployment
and labor supply that captures these features. My goal is to estimate the model using
Argentine household survey data. I do not attempt to identify any of the theoretical models
of trade and unemployment. Rather, I am interested in exploring the impacts of higher
5export prices of agro-manufacture exports when labor markets in developing countries are
not fully ﬂexible. In other words, this paper is an attempt at measuring the potential beneﬁts
(and costs) of enhanced export opportunities in a context without full wage adjustment.
My empirical model is conceptually simple. Firms maximize proﬁts and demand labor.
Workers maximize utility and supply labor. As explained above, unemployment is assumed
to be generated by some frictions present in the economy.
I discuss labor demand ﬁrst. In a typical general equilibrium model of trade, labor
markets are linked to trade through the relative prices of exports and imports. This is the
Stolper-Samuelson result (in a 2 × 2 model) or some of its variants for multidimensional
models (Dixit and Norman, 1980). For a small open economy, prices are determined in
world markets and are thus taken as given. Given export (and import) prices, ﬁrms choose
factors of production optimally. This leads to a set of labor demand functions for diﬀerent
types of labor, that is workers with diﬀerent schooling (particularly unskilled, semi-skilled,
skilled). For my purposes, the important fact is that these labor demand functions depend
on the level of the prices of traded goods. As a result, faced with higher export prices,
agro-manufacturing ﬁrms will increase the demand for labor of varying skills. In a model
with ﬂexible prices, this increase in labor demand will cause an increase in wages for diﬀerent
skills (and thus in the implicit returns to schooling).
The derivation of labor supply follows from standard processes of utility maximization.
To allow for labor market participation and labor supply responses, I assume that each worker
has a reservation wage. Each individual compares his market wage (given his characteristics
like age and, fundamentally for my purposes, his schooling) with the reservation wage to
6enter the labor force. This deﬁnes whether a worker belongs to the active workforce or
becomes inactive instead.
To model unemployment eﬀects, I build on the idea developed in Blundell, Ham, and
Meghir (1987) and assume that, due to search and costly matching—and since there is
an unemployment pool in the economy—the hiring process takes place through a job oﬀer
mechanism. To hire a worker, ﬁrms scrutinize the labor market and make job oﬀers to
selected active workers at the market wage (which may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent selected
workers). Active workers need a job oﬀer by one of the ﬁrms to become employed. If a
worker receives a job oﬀer, the vacancy is ﬁlled. Whether a worker who is in the active labor
force becomes employed or unemployed depend critically on these job oﬀers. In the end, the
eﬀects of trade protection and export prices on employment and unemployment depend on
the relative response of wages, employment oﬀers and labor supply.
2.1 The Empirical Model
The simple model sketched above can be estimated with three regression functions: a wage
equation, a reservation wage equation, and a job oﬀer equation. The wage equation deﬁnes
market wages, which are a function of trade policies as well as of domestic variables and
individual characteristics. The reservation wage depends, too, on individual characteristics
and on the characteristics of the worker’s family. The job oﬀer equation depends on
trade variables as well as on workers’ characteristics that may attract ﬁrms. This feature
accommodates cases where, for example, skilled individuals earn higher wages and are more
likely to receive job oﬀers.
7I assume that trade has an eﬀect on all three regression functions. It is intuitive to
allow the job oﬀer mechanism to depend on trade (via export prices) since new export
opportunities open up new jobs. Further, wages will be aﬀected by trade shocks through
the induced changes in labor demand and supply, as in the Stolper-Samuelson logic. Finally,
reservation wages may depend on export prices through general equilibrium eﬀects outside
the labor market (via changes in household behavior), through expected eﬀects on the
length of unemployment or growth rates, or through government transfers tied to customs
revenues. Although the estimation of these reservation wage eﬀects is not essential for my
purposes, allowing for them makes the ﬁnal model more ﬂexible and signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes
the maximization of the likelihood function (see below).
Since I model the eﬀects of trade on the domestic economy through international export
and import prices (particularly of agro-manufactures), my strategy requires using prices of
exports and imports as explanatory variables in the regressions. Similar models have been
used by Deaton (1997), to estimate demand elasticities, Goldberg and Tracy (2003), to study
exchange rates and wages, Porto (2006), to examine trade and inequality, and Wolak (1996),
to look at deregulation in the telecommunication industry. Details follow.






ie β + β
0
wedi lnpai + ui, (1)
where wi is the log of the (monthly) wage earned by individual i and pa is the international
price of agro-manufactured exports. The error term u is assumed to be a normally distributed
8random variable with variance σ2
u so that u ∼ N(0,σ2
u).
Since I am interested in capturing wage price-elasticities that diﬀer by labor skills, I
interact prices with educational dummies, which are represented by the vector edi. Three
labor categories are considered: unskilled (primary education), semi-skilled (secondary
education) and skilled labor (college education). The wage price elasticities are denoted
by the three-element vector βw. In the estimation, I include prices interacted with the three
educational dummies; an equivalent procedure would be to include prices separately and add
two interactions with the skill dummies. Introducing the three interactions provides direct
estimates of the wage-price elasticities and it is thus more convenient.
I add a comprehensive set of controls in (1). Wages depend on a vector e xi which includes
individual characteristics like age, (and age squared), gender and marital status, as well as
on a separate set of educational dummies that accounts for diﬀerences in returns to schooling
not related to the trade shocks. To control for technical change and other preference and
proﬁt shifters, I follow Roberts and Tybout (1997) and introduce a trend in (1). I interact
the trend with the educational dummies so as to capture diﬀerential technological change
by skill intensity, too.
These trends also capture other macroeconomic factors that may have aﬀected wages.
During the period under study, Argentina adopted a currency board in 1991 that led to a huge
crisis in 2001. While in the estimation I only use data from 1992 to 1999, so that the crisis
period is excluded from the estimation, there is concern that some of the macroeconomic
tensions that gave rise to the crisis were present even before 2001. To further control for
these factors, and on top of the aggregate trends, I include an index price of both import
9and non-agricultural export prices, interacted with the educational dummies too. This price
index serves two purposes: to account for the role of relative prices and to control for
macro-factors.








i is a function of individual and aggregate variables, zi, with parameter vector α. I
include the sex of the individual, the marital status, the education level (as above), an
interaction between the gender dummy and the marital status indicator, the number of
members in the household, the non-labor income of the household, education dummies
interacted with the prices of agro-manufactured exports, education dummies interacted with
the price of imports and non-agricultural exports, regional dummies, and trends interacted
with educational dummies. Reservation wages may depend on prices because of general
equilibrium eﬀects that aﬀect household behavior, the expected length of unemployment or
the general perception of growth in the economy. This can aﬀect the level of wages at which
an individual may decide to work. Also, prices may aﬀect the level of public transfers, such as
unemployment beneﬁts, that aﬀect reservation wages (in developing countries, a signiﬁcant
fraction of public resources comes from taxes on international transactions). The error term
is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2
v, v ∼ N(0,σ2
v).
In some models of selection in agriculture the errors are, for simplicity, assumed to be
independent (Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000). In other models, like Bellemare and
10Barrett (2006), errors are instead allowed to be correlated. In my model, I follow this
latter approach and do not impose independence between the error of the wage regression
and the error of the reservation wage. This interdependence between errors complicates the
likelihood, but describes a more realistic empirical model. The covariance between the errors
v and u is denoted by σ2
uv.
The reservation wage equation is introduced to model the labor market participation of
the individual. Every period, individual i chooses to enter the work force if his market wage
is greater than the reservation wage. The probability that wi > wr


















uv, and that cov(ui,e ui) = σ2
e uu = σ2
u − σ2
uv. It follows that ui and e ui have a
bivariate normal distribution with correlation parameter ρ = σe uu/σe uσu. The complement
probability, 1 − Pwi, determines the probability of being inactive (not willing to participate
in the market).
The last equation of the model describes the job oﬀer probability function. As opposed
to standard labor supply models, which assume that an individual can ﬁnd employment
at his market wage with certainty, I allow for the possibility that someone who wants to
work is unable to ﬁnd a job by requiring that an active worker receive a job oﬀer to become






iγ + εi (4)
= e m
0
ie γ + β
0
oedi lnpai + εi.
Thus, individual i gets a job oﬀer (oi = 1) if o∗
i = m0
iγ + εi > 0, whereas he does not (oi = 0)
if m0
iγ + εi < 0. In fact, if the error term εi is drawn from a symmetric distribution with
zero mean, the probability of getting a job oﬀer is
(5) Poi = Po(mi;γ) = P(εi < m
0
iγ).
In the vector mi (the individual determinants of receiving an oﬀer), I introduce aggregate
labor demand variables that can be associated with trade policies. As in the wage equation,
this can be done by including the prices of agro-manufactured exports interacted with the
education dummies (edi lnpai), as regressors. The response of job oﬀers to price changes
is given by the vector βo (for diﬀerent educational attainments). To control for relative
prices and other macroeconomic factors, the regression includes import and non-agricultural
export prices and trends interacted with the educational dummies, too. Other controls in m
are regional dummies. These variables capture the role of local labor markets and national
employment trends in determining the chance of getting a job oﬀer. For example, regional
dummies would capture the eﬀects of regional unemployment rates, an indication of the
conditions of regional labor markets. Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender,
12marital status, education, are introduced as well.
The error term εi is distributed N(0,1). Since the job oﬀer function leads to a
dichotomous variable oi, the scale of this part of the model (the variance of εi) cannot
be identiﬁed. Following Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987), εi is assumed to be independent
of ui and vi, the errors in equations (1) and (2).
Those individuals who want to work (i.e., those with wi > wr
i) must receive a job oﬀer
to be employed. Hence, the probability of being employed, Pei, is
(6) Pei = Pw(xi,zi;β,α)Po(mi;γ);
the probability of being unemployed, Pui, is
(7) Pui = Pw(xi,zi;β,α)[1 − Po(mi;γ)].
The present model is a more complicated version of the standard selection model of Gronau
(1974) and Heckman (1974). To estimate it, I write the model as a modiﬁed Tobit 2 model























where f(·) is the normal density function of the wage wi.7 The ﬁrst and second factors
in (8) capture the probabilities of being inactive and unemployed, respectively. The
last factor is the probability of observing wage wi, conditional on being employed; this
13requires a positive net wage for worker i and a job oﬀer. Notice that f(wi|y∗





i > 0), and that f(wi,y∗
i) = f(wi)f(y∗
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i|wi is normally distributed



























































where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal.
2.2 The Data
I use two sources of information: household surveys and price indexes. Data on export
prices of agro-manufactures are taken from the Statistical Institute in Argentina (INDEC).
Data on individual characteristics and labor markets are taken from the Argentine Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares, EPH (permanent household survey). The EPHs are household
surveys that gather information on wages, employment status, income (not expenditures),
sector of employment, and other individual and household characteristics (age, gender,
number of household members, demographic composition, etc.). The EPH is a repeated
cross-section and the data are collected twice per year, in May and October.8 In this paper,
I use data from 1992 to 1999, a total of sixteen EPH surveys.
Since over 85 percent of the Argentine population lives in urban areas, the EPHs are
urban surveys. In consequence, my focus is on urban employment and unemployment
14and I omit any analysis of farm employment and rural labor markets. Moreover, and
partly for this reason, I restrict the analysis to the impact of changes in the prices of
agro-manufactures exports, leaving aside the impacts of changes in the export prices of
agricultural commodities.9
Table 1 reports the main trends in three variables of interest: the employment status of
the individual, monthly wages, and the level of the price of agro-industrial exports. In the
Table, I report data on all workers in all sectors.10 The sample is restricted to include all
“employed” workers, leaving aside the self-employed. Sample sizes of employed, unemployed
and inactive individuals of working age are reported as well.
The average wage of unskilled workers (primary education) increased until 1995 and
declined afterwards to reach, in 1999, a level comparable to that in 1992. The wages of
semi-skilled workers (secondary education) increased until 1996, and then stabilized. In
1999, average wages declined, but were still higher than in 1992. The wages of skilled
workers (college education) ﬂuctuated more: they increased until 1995, declined in 1996,
and then recovered again until 1998. In 1999, wages are higher than in 1992, indicating
positive growth during the period.
The Argentine Statistical Institute provides data on the international prices of Argentine
exports of agro-manufactured goods, which include dairy product, beef, oils and fats, and
food-processing goods. These export prices show an increasing trend (with ﬂuctuations)
from 1992 to 1997, and a decline in more recent years.11
In the EPH survey, there are three employment categories: employed, unemployed and
inactive. The employment categories are deﬁned on a weekly basis—this type of reporting is
15standard to measure aggregate unemployment in the economy as well as the size of the active
labor force. An employed individual is one who wants to work (his market wage is higher
than his reservation wage in the model) and receives a job oﬀer. An unemployed person wants
to work but does not receive an oﬀer. Finally, inactive individuals do not want to work (their
reservation wage is higher than their market wage). In the analysis, I include all employed
workers (in all sector), all unemployed individuals, and all inactive individuals aged 18-65.
Student and retirees are excluded, as well as those self-employed. Notice that there may be
more than one adult in the sample from a given household. In the model, however, I assumed
that the decisions of each agent are taken individually (conditional on the behavior of other
members of the household especially in determining the reservation wage). Allowing for
interdependence of intra-household decisions could be an interesting extension of this model.
However, since 65 percent of households report one working member (and 80 percent report
one or two working members) the assumption of independence is unlikely to aﬀect my main
conclusions.
Table 1 shows the fraction of the labor force (deﬁned as working age population) in each
category. Starting from 1992, the proportion of employed individuals increased in 1993,
dropped thereafter until 1996, and slightly recovered afterwards. The proportion of inactive
individuals remained roughly constant throughout the period. The proportion of unemployed
workers, on the other hand, steadily increased until May 1996, declined until May 1999 and
increased a little in October 1999. Notice that this is the share of the population that is
unemployed. It is not the unemployment rate, which is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of
unemployed individuals to the total number of employed and unemployed people (excluding
16the inactive).
2.3 Results
The model is estimated with maximum likelihood methods. Although the likelihood
function in (9) is complicated, it satisﬁes all the properties of a Tobit 2 Model (Amemiya,
1985). Therefore, convergence in the maximization algorithm is straightforward (but
time consuming). In fact, the estimation of the model can be performed with the Stata
Corporation built-in (ml) maximizer routine (Gould, Pitblado and Sribney, 2003).12
The results of the estimation of the model in (1), (2) and (4) are reported in Table 2.
The columns show the estimated coeﬃcients of the wage equation (b β), of the labor market
participation (net wage) equation (b δ = b β− b α), and of the job oﬀer equation (b γ). Since I am
regressing individual outcomes on aggregate variables (like prices), the standard errors are
corrected for clustering (Kloek, 1981). These are reported in squared brackets below each
coeﬃcient.
I ﬁnd that an increase in the prices of agro-manufactured exports raises wages in
Argentina. The responses are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for all types of labor,
but not very large: from a value of 0.5 for unskilled labor, to 0.52 for semi-skilled labor, and
to 0.57 for skilled labor. This means that a one percent increase in the price of agro-industrial
exports (due to, for example, lower protection of agricultural markets in the North) would
cause Argentine wages to increase by 0.5-0.57 percent. Notice that the model measures
general equilibrium eﬀects, so that the change in the price of agro-goods may have an impact
on the wages earned in diﬀerent sectors through intersectoral labor reallocation and spillover
17eﬀects. A similar issue, albeit in a diﬀerent context, is raised by Dyer, Boucher, and Taylor
(2006). They model supply responses of subsistence households that are indirectly linked
to market prices through spillovers in factor markets for labor or land. They ﬁnd strong
evidence in support of spillovers from market to subsistence. In Porto (2007), I present for
robustness results from a model with tradable sectors only (so that spillovers are assumed not
to be transmitted to the non-tradable sector). In this case, I ﬁnd that the wage elasticities
are similar to those reported in the text but that the job-oﬀer elasticities (see below) are
somewhat larger.
Wages respond in a sensible way to the other controls. They are positively associated with
age, at a decreasing rate, while males and married individuals earn higher wages. Trends
and educational dummies behave as expected: whereas there is a declining trend in the
wages of unskilled workers, there is growth in semi-skilled wages and faster growth in skilled
wages. Recall that these interactions of education dummies and time trends are included to
capture technical change (probably skill-biased) and other supply and demand shifters (such
as factor endowments). Finally, wages respond negatively to the index price of imports and
non-agricultural exports.
An interesting implication of these results is that technical change may have been
more important than export prices in shaping the recent trends in the skill premium in
Argentina. The wage regression shows that, while higher export prices raise wages, they do
that uniformly across skill categories. However, the overall trends (interacted with the skill
dummies) are indeed diﬀerent across those skill categories and part of these eﬀects are due to
technical change (although notice that these trends capture macroeconomic factors as well).
18The second column of the table reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the net wage equation,
the diﬀerence between the market wage and the reservation wage.13 I ﬁnd that the export
price of agro-industrial goods is positively associated with net wages for unskilled and
semi-skilled workers; this means that higher export prices lead to higher net wages and
higher probabilities of participation for these individuals. These results reveal that labor
supply would respond positively to trade shocks in Argentina, particularly for unskilled and
semi-skilled workers.
More experienced workers have higher net wages (or, lower relative reservation wages)
and thus show higher labor market participation. The same is true with males. Moreover,
a married male has a higher net wage, while a married woman has a lower net wage. This
makes women and married women more likely to be inactive (i.e., to have a lower labor
market participation rate). Interestingly, males with large families tend to be more active,
willing to work. Finally, the reservation wage is higher (and therefore the participation in
the labor market becomes lower) as non-labor income increases.
The last column of Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the job oﬀer equation.
An increase in the price of agro-manufactured goods boosts job oﬀers in Argentina. These
responses are positive and signiﬁcant for all educational levels: for unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, the coeﬃcient is 0.59 and for skilled workers, it is 0.88. The diﬀerences in the
coeﬃcients are hardly signiﬁcant at usual conﬁdence levels. The implications of this result
in terms of the probability of employment and unemployment in Argentina are discussed in
section 3.
The additional controls behave as expected. More experienced workers, as measured by
19age, are more likely to receive a job oﬀer. Most importantly, the coeﬃcients of the trends
(interacted with the educational dummies) reveal that there is a tendency to observe a decline
in job oﬀers during the period. These declines tend to be largest among unskilled workers,
intermediate for semi-skilled workers, and smallest among skilled workers.
The following scale parameters are estimated: b σ
2
u = 0.62 and b ρ = −0.15. Since the scale
of e u cannot be identiﬁed, I set σ2
e u = 1 without loss of generality. It follows that b σ
2
e uu = 0.014,
σ2
uv = 0.606, and σ2
v = 1.592.
It is important to notice that the estimates reported here are speciﬁc to the Argentine
experience. On the one hand, there are features of the economy that are speciﬁc to Argentina,
such as factor endowment, or technology and factor intensity use in import and export
sectors. On the other hand, the macroeconomic context, as explained above, was very
peculiar. Further, results depend to some extent on the conditions and frictions that generate
unemployment. Hence, a diﬀerent set of initial conditions may lead to measurements of
diﬀerent parameters and price elasticities.
3 The Impacts
In this section, I use the estimated coeﬃcients of the previous section to explore the eﬀects
of higher agro-manufactured export prices, possibly due to trade reforms in the developed
world, on wages, employment and unemployment in Argentina. Notice that my analysis is
purposefully narrow in that I focus only on the impacts of export prices of agro-industrial
goods rather than on general equilibrium price eﬀects. This is because my objective in this
paper is to develop methods to measure the potential impacts of trade reforms (via export
20prices) in the presence of imperfections in labor market adjustment. I claim that this type
of analysis is necessary to provide a much detailed description of how the population will be
aﬀected by trade liberalization in world markets.
To estimate policy impacts, I adopt a two-step methodology as in Chen and Ravallion
(2004), Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005), Deaton (1997), and Porto (2006), among others.
This methodology requires the combination of the estimated parameters of section 2 with
a (policy-induced) price change of agro-manufactured exports. To illustrate how the model
works, in what follows I adopt a generic increase in the export prices of agro-manufactures
of Argentina of 10 percent.
Although I do not model this price change in my analysis, it is useful to think
about scenarios that could potentially generate it. One such scenario is agricultural
trade liberalization in developed countries (perhaps following the WTO Doha Development
Agenda). As it is well known, agricultural protection in world markets is widespread and
includes diﬀerent policy mechanisms, such as ad-valorem tariﬀs, speciﬁc tariﬀs, non-tariﬀ
barriers, antidumping threats, technical barriers, quality standards, export subsidies, and
production subsidies.14 A glance at the level of protection faced by Argentine exports is
given by Messerlin (2001). He estimates the tariﬀ rates levied by the European Union on
agriculture: Cereals get an average MFN tariﬀ of 14 percent, Meat, of 11.2 percent, and Dairy
Products, of 9.7 percent; the average ad-valorem tariﬀ on Food Products is 19.5 percent.
Non-tariﬀ barriers are important as well: from 5 percent in Cereals and in Food Products,
to 64.8 percent in Meat, 100.3 percent in Dairy, and 125 percent in Sugar. The overall rate
of protection, the sum of the MFN tariﬀs and the tariﬀ equivalent of the non-tariﬀ barriers,
21is impressive: Sugar gets a 125 percent protection, Dairy, 110 percent, Meat, 76 percent, and
Cereals, 19 percent. Food Products get a 24.5 percent tariﬀ equivalent. The average overall
border protection of agricultural goods is estimated at 27.6 percent. Hence, assuming that
the elimination of some of these barriers will cause an increase in the international prices of
agro-manufactured products seems quite reasonable.
However, assessing the magnitude of the price increase is less obvious. Notice that
estimating the pass-through of trade policies to prices is outside the scope of this project.
There is a huge literature that has tried to do this, with mixed success and results. There are
essentially two approaches that can be used to estimate these price changes: econometric
studies and Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE). For the case of agricultural
protection on world prices, Beghin et al. (2002) use CGE models to estimate an increase
in prices of 15.4 percent, while Hoekman et al. (2004) use econometric models to ﬁnd an
increase of 7.5 percent. In a comprehensive study of the implications of the Doha Round,
Hertel and Winters (2006) deploy an improved CGE model (that combines a global model
with several national models) and ﬁnd an average increase in agricultural prices of roughly
11 percent. Accordingly, the 10 percent price increase that I use is somewhat in the middle
of the price change estimates in Beghin et al. (2002) and Hoekman et al. (2004) and in line
with those in Hertel and Winters (2006).
The advantage of focusing on the impacts of one price change is simplicity in the way the
methodology works and clarity in the forces behind the results. This type of comparative
static results with respect to a major export price is a feature shared by many other papers
in the literature like Deaton (1989) and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005). However, notice that
22I am not carrying out any trade policy evaluation. On the one hand, the price changes
used in this study cannot be necessarily attributed to a speciﬁc trade reform (like Doha).
On the other hand, some of the general equilibrium eﬀects will be lost. For example, a
reform like Doha would not only aﬀect agro-industry prices but also the equilibrium prices
of non-agricultural exports and imports. In a comprehensive evaluation of this policy, those
general equilibrium eﬀects are unavoidable. Here, I instead adopt this narrower approach to
make the point that labor market adjustment, and its interaction with trade reforms, can
matter a lot in such an evaluation.
3.1 Employment and Unemployment
I begin by looking at the impacts on employment and unemployment probabilities. The




where G(·) is the distribution function of individual attributes xi, zi and mi. Similarly, the




23The probability of being unemployed is not the same as the unemployment rate, which is




















The change in the aggregate probability of being employed, equation (13), can be recovered
as the average change in the individual probabilities of employment Pei. Similarly, the change
in the aggregate probability of being unemployed (equation (14)) is the average of individual
changes in Pui.























The eﬀects of trade policies that aﬀect the international prices of agro-manufactured
Argentine exports on employment comprise two channels: a participation eﬀect,
(f(q0
iδ)(∂q0
iδ/∂ lnpai)Po), and a job oﬀer eﬀect, (Pwf(m0
iγ)(∂m0
iγ/∂ lnpai)). The
participation eﬀect arises because trade policy aﬀects the market wage and the reservation
24wage. Based on the estimates in section 2, lower trade protection in world markets raises the
net wage (the diﬀerence between the market wage and the reservation wage) thereby inducing
a larger number of workers to participate in the labor market. For a given probability
of getting an oﬀer, Poi, this raises Pei (that is, conditional on getting an oﬀer, a higher
participation in the labor market increases the employment rate). The job oﬀer eﬀect arises
because the expansion of the agro-manufacturing sector induces ﬁrms to hire more workers
and make more job oﬀers. Since both the participation and the job oﬀer eﬀects are positive,
lower agricultural protection increases the probability of being employed.























As before, there is a participation and a job oﬀer eﬀect. On the one hand, the fact that
higher export prices raise the employment participation of the Argentine workforce implies
an increase in unemployment, conditional on the probability of not receiving an oﬀer, 1−Poi.
On the other hand, the increase in labor demand increases the probability of getting an oﬀer,
unemployment declining as a result (this is the negative of the job oﬀer eﬀect in equation
(15)). The net eﬀect depends on which of these two forces dominate.













25which is negative. Higher export prices raise the net wage and cause a decline in the
probability of being inactive (that is, increases labor market participation). Notice that













To estimate equations (15), (16) and (17), I need the coeﬃcients reported in section 2 and
the generic changes in agro-manufactured exports of 10 percent.
In Table 3, I report the estimated changes in employment probabilities. The
leftmost panel displays the eﬀects on the probability of being employed (disentangling the
participation eﬀect and the job oﬀer eﬀect). The central panel shows the eﬀects on the
probability of being unemployed (disentangling the two eﬀects as before) and the rightmost
panel reports the eﬀects on the probability of being inactive.
The numbers within square brackets in Table 3 represent the standard errors of the
changes in the probabilities. I estimate the variance-covariance matrix with bootstrap
methods, as follows. Stacking the vector of coeﬃcients δ, β,and γ, I construct a vector θ
such that
√
n(b θ − θ) −→d N(0,Vθ). Estimation of the model delivers the estimated vector
b θ and the estimated asymptotic variance, b Vθ −→p Vθ. To estimate the standard errors, I
take draws e θ from the multinormal empirical distribution N(b θ, b Vθ), and I reevaluate (15),
(16) and (17). Repeating this procedure 50 times, I obtain a bootstrap sample of the average
changes in probabilities that can be used to estimate their standard errors.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that higher agro-manufactured export prices (induced,
26for example, by lower trade protection in the North) increase employment in Argentina by
1.36 percentage points. The participation eﬀect accounts for 0.52 points (38 percent) and
the job oﬀer eﬀect accounts for the remaining 0.84 percentage points (62 percent of the total
employment eﬀect). Employment increases because the elimination of the trade protection
on agro-manufacturing in the developed world would boost the Argentine economy as the
agro-industry expands (the job oﬀer eﬀect) and absorbs a larger number of a growing active
workforce (the participation eﬀect).
The counterpart of this increase in the probability of employment is a decline in
Pu (the probability of being unemployed) by 0.75 percentage points, and a decline in
PI (the probability of being inactive) by 0.61 percentage points. Since the increase in
agro-manufactured export prices raises net wages (market wages net of reservation wages),
a larger number of the working age individuals decide to enter the workforce. I estimate this
eﬀect to be equal to 0.61 percentage points, of which 0.52 (percentage points) manage to get
a job oﬀer and become employed and the remaining 0.09 percentage points do not get an
oﬀer and thus become unemployed. From the pool of pre-price change unemployed workers,
0.84 percentage points ﬁnally get an oﬀer and become employed. In the end, the probability
of being unemployed declines by 0.75 (0.84−0.09) percentage points because the number of
those previously unemployed that get a job is greater than the number of previously inactive
individuals that become unemployed.
As already mentioned, the unemployment rate diﬀers from the probability of being
unemployed (as deﬁned in (7)) because the unemployment rate is the probability of being
unemployed conditional on being active (i.e., willing to participate in the labor market). The
27unemployment rate in (12) was estimated at 13.32 percent using data for October 1998. The

















The last column of Table 3 shows that a 10 percent increase in the price of agro-manufactured
exports would cause the unemployment rate to decline by 1.23 percentage points, i.e., from
approximately 13.32 to 12.09 percent. This is a substantial change: higher export prices
would bring the unemployment rate down by roughly 10 percent.
To relate this type of trade reform with poverty, I look at the employment-unemployment
eﬀects separately for the poor and the non-poor. In the second and third rows of Table 3,
I report that the impacts tend to be rather similar for these two groups. For instance, the
probability of becoming employed increases by 1.45 percentage points for the poor and by
1.34 percentage points for the non-poor. Interestingly, the probability of being unemployed
declines by more for the non-poor (−0.78 percentage points) than for the poor (−0.74 points),
but the change in the probability of participating in the labor market increases more for the
poor (0.67) than for the non-poor (0.60). This is because the majority of inactive individuals
before the price change is actually poor. Notice, however, that all these diﬀerences are hardly
signiﬁcant (from a statistical viewpoint). The same pattern can be discerned across quintiles
of household per equivalent adult income. The changes in the probability of being employed
are relatively similar across quintiles: from 1.46 percent in the ﬁrst quintile, to 1.17 percent
28in the ﬁfth quintile. Notice that both the participation eﬀect and the job oﬀer eﬀect tends
to be higher for the lowest quintiles. The probability of being unemployed declines with
income, by 0.78 points in the ﬁrst quintile to 0.68 points in the last quintile. In addition,
the change in the probability of being inactive declines with the quintile, by 0.67 percentage
points in the ﬁrst quintile to 0.49 percentage points in the ﬁfth quintile. These diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant.
3.2 Expected Wages
The expected wage responds to agricultural protection through changes in the market wage
and through changes in the probability of being employed, unemployed or inactive. Let p0
ai be
the price level of agricultural exports in the presence of agricultural protection in developed
countries; the expected wage is
(20) E[w|p
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29where a hat over a variable stands for its estimated value (from the estimates of the regression
function and of the probabilities in the MLE). Changes in expected wages can arise because
of two factors. For a given expected market wage, realized expected wages can increase due to
a higher probability of being employed; this is the employment probability eﬀect. Given the
probability of being employed, Pe(pai), lower trade protection and higher agro-manufactured
export prices would increase the realized expected wages because of the increase in market
wages; this is the wage eﬀect.
The aggregate expected wage can be estimated by integrating (averaging) over
individuals. In Table 4, I report the change in expected wages and its decomposition in the
employment probability eﬀect and the wage eﬀect. Standard errors computed with bootstrap
methods are reported within squared brackets. On average, Argentine wages increase almost
one to one with prices: a 10 percent increase in export prices raises expected wages by 10.39
percent. Interestingly, these impacts do not vary signiﬁcantly across population groups (poor
versus the non-poor), or across quintiles of per equivalent adult income.
A key result of this paper is that most of the increase in expected wages (7.45 percentage
points) can be attributed to the increase in the probability of becoming employed. This is,
in eﬀect, an increase in the wage of those who were unemployed and become employed due
to trade. Only the remaining 2.94 percentage points originate in higher wages, conditional
on being employed (i.e., an increase in the wage of those workers who are already employed).
This result implies that to truly capture how household welfare reacts to trade in developing
countries, the estimation of ﬁrst order eﬀects are generally not enough and that second order
eﬀects (like employment responses) are essential.
304 Conclusions
This paper has studied the impacts of agro-manufacturing export prices on wages,
employment and unemployment in Argentina. In principle, lower protection of agricultural
world markets would lead to higher prices of agro-manufactured exports and to an expansion
of the agro-industry sector. This, in turn, would lead to higher wages, more job openings, and
lower unemployment. It follows that changes in export prices (possibly due to trade reforms
in world markets) aﬀect workers directly, through higher wages, and indirectly, through more
job oﬀers and labor supply decisions. A major claim of this paper is that the bulk of the
impacts of trade reforms on the welfare of the population will take place through quantity
adjustments in labor markets. This implies that the focus on wage adjustment only, as in
most of the trade and wages literature, will provide a biased picture of the beneﬁts and costs
of trade liberalization. This paper has tried to ﬁll a gap in which the impacts of trade may be
blurred by the existence of imperfections in labor markets, rigidities, and adjustment costs.
I have found that a 10 percent increase in the price of Argentine agro-manufactured
exports would bring about an increase of 1.36 percentage points in the probability of being
employed. This change would be accounted for by an increase of 0.61 percentage points in the
probability of labor market participation, and a decline in the probability of unemployment
of 0.75 percentage points. The unemployment rate would decline by almost 10 percent or
by 1.23 percentage points.
Expected market wages would increase almost one to one with export prices. More than
70 percent of this change would be brought about by a higher probability of getting a job.
This result conﬁrms that the gains from trade are not only revealed by higher market wages,
31but also by lower unemployment, thus highlighting the importance of unemployment and
labor supply responses in empirical work on trade policies. Based on this evidence, I conclude
that the ﬁrst order approximations often used in the trade literature will fail to capture an
important fraction of the total impacts. In fact, the estimation of labor market responses is
necessarily a critical component of any serious welfare evaluation of trade reforms.
Notes
1A few key examples are Deaton (1989), who analyzes the ﬁrst order eﬀects of export taxes on rice in
Thailand, Goetz (1992), who set up a selectivity model of food marketing in Senegal, and Key, Sadoulet,
and de Janvry (2000), who explore supply responses in the presence of transaction costs in Mexico.
2See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for an overview.
3There is a view that argues that trade does not aﬀect unemployment, because unemployment is
determined by the natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Even if international trade does not aﬀect
the NAIRU, trade may have strong short run eﬀects on unemployment that are worth investigating.
4Some examples of quantitative analysis of trade reforms with adjustment costs in industrial countries
are Magee (1972), Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson (1980), de Melo and Tarr (1990), Takacks and Winters
(1991). A good example of how relevant these costs are in developing countries is McMillan, Welch and
Rodrik (2003).
5Dyer, Boucher and Taylor (2006) reach similar conclusions in their analysis of farm responses to market
price changes. They show that market prices can have “ ... strong impacts even on subsistence farmers when
...” spillovers through factor markets are taken into consideration.
326In the simplest setting compatible with Figure 1, w is the minimum wage; but search costs or eﬃciency
wages can easily be incorporated in similar graphs.
7Notice that the independence between ε and u or e u has been used in deriving the likelihood.
8There is a panel component from 1998 that I do not use in my analysis.
9Primary products are likely to have smaller spillovers than agro-manufactures. First, the primary
sector in Argentina, although important in terms of exports, is much smaller in terms of the generation
of employment and wage income. Second, primary products feed into the agro-industry sector and thus
increases in export commodity prices can also generate negative spillover eﬀects.
10See Porto (2007) for a model of the tradable sector only.
11Although not reported in Table 1, the regression model includes an index price of both non-agricultural
export and import prices as well.
12For details on the code, see Porto (2007). The maximization of the likelihood becomes much more
complicated if I do not allow prices to aﬀect the reservation wage directly. In this case, a restriction on
the coeﬃcients γ should be added to the likelihood function. (Concretely, the restriction imposes the price
coeﬃcients in the wage equation to be the same as in the labor participation equation). This signiﬁcantly
complicates the maximization algorithm.
13To interpret the coeﬃcients in the second column, notice that they represent the diﬀerence β − α. If
a regressor j (such as prices) is in both equations, then the reported coeﬃcient is βj − αj. Instead, if the
regressor is only in the reservation wage equation, then the coeﬃcient represents −αj. Notice that all the
regressors in the wage equation x are in z.
14These trade barriers constitute an approximation to agricultural trade costs, as in Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004). There is a large literature that measures and analyzes the protection of world agricultural
markets. There is, for instance, a series of studies carried out by the Institute of International Economics
33that includes Hufbauer and Elliot (1994) for the US and Messerlin (2001) for the EU.
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Trade, Wages, and Unemployment
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Note: The graph depicts the equilibrium of a speciﬁc factor model. The market wage is
assumed to be above market clearing (w) so that unemployment arises in the model. The
ﬁgure depicts the mechanisms triggered by an increase in the price of agro-manufactured
export pa.
39Table 1
Summary Statistics: Wages, Price, and Employment Status
Argentina: 1992 -1999
Wages (in logs) Export Prices Employment Status Unempl. Sample
(1) (2) (3) agro-manuf. (5) (6) (7) Rate Size
1992 (May) 5.86 6.04 6.38 4.5778 56.22 39.53 4.25 7.03 17879
1992 (Oct) 5.87 6.14 6.50 4.5880 58.25 37.72 4.03 6.47 19003
1993 (May) 5.95 6.21 6.59 4.5941 58.91 34.95 6.14 9.44 20797
1993 (Oct) 5.98 6.27 6.64 4.6357 57.96 36.27 5.78 9.06 20770
1994 (May) 5.94 6.25 6.65 4.6357 58.26 35.73 6.01 9.35 26083
1994 (Oct) 5.95 6.27 6.69 4.6191 56.95 35.88 7.17 11.19 26203
1995 (May) 5.96 6.26 6.73 4.6347 56.21 32.58 11.21 16.63 24782
1995 (Oct) 5.90 6.25 6.70 4.6357 55.57 34.47 9.96 15.19 28619
1996 (May) 5.88 6.25 6.66 4.6501 54.72 35.22 10.06 15.53 30285
1996 (Oct) 5.85 6.21 6.66 4.7005 55.14 34.26 10.59 16.12 27552
1997 (May) 5.84 6.24 6.68 4.6663 57.23 33.55 9.22 13.88 31513
1997 (Oct) 5.83 6.22 6.70 4.7068 58.39 33.57 8.04 12.10 31695
1998 (May) 5.87 6.23 6.74 4.6463 59.31 32.94 7.75 11.55 29613
1998 (Oct) 5.84 6.24 6.75 4.6062 59.55 33.29 7.16 10.73 28093
1999 (May) 5.74 6.15 6.66 4.4785 54.67 37.97 7.37 11.87 21646
1999 (Oct) 5.77 6.17 6.67 4.3833 58.03 33.31 8.66 12.99 25066
Note: the data come from the EPH, Permanent Household Survey. For a given year, EPH gathers data on May and
October. Columns (1) to (3) report the average (log) wages by education category, unskilled (1), semi-skilled (2),
and skilled (3). Column (4) displays the international price of agro-manufacturing exports. Column (5) shows the
proportion of the population that is employed, column (6), the proportion of the population that is inactive, and
column (7), the proportion that is unemployed (as deﬁned in the text). The unemployment rate is deﬁned as the










Unskilled Labor 0.50 0.26 0.59
[0.04] [0.10] [0.12]
SemiSkilled Labor 0.52 0.27 0.59
[0.04] [0.12] [0.14]
Skilled Labor 0.57 0.15 0.88
[0.06] [0.20] [0.20]
age 0.05 0.22 0.12
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
age squared –0.001 –0.003 –0.001
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00003]
male 0.25 0.40 -
[0.006] [0.012]
married 0.16 –0.93 -
[0.002] [0.0089]
male * married - 1.69 -
[0.017]
# members * male - 0.004 -
[0.0016]
non-wage income - –0.001 -
[0.0001]
trend * Unskilled Dummy –0.002 0.001 –0.008
[0.0004] [0.001] [0.0014]
trend * SemiSkilled Dummy 0.004 –0.004 –0.008
[0.0005] [0.002] [0.0017]
trend * Skilled Dummy 0.013 0.004 –0.007
[0.0009] [0.003] [0.0026]
Price Index * Unskilled Dummy –0.72 —0.62 –3.23
[0.08] [0.22] [0.26]
Price Index * SemiSkilled Dummy –0.67 –0.60 –3.21
[0.08] [0.23] [0.28]
Price Index * Skilled Dummy –0.65 –0.28 –3.43
[0.09] [0.28] [0.31]
constant 5.71 –1.72 11.25
[0.24] [0.68] [0.821]
Regional Dummies yes yes yes
Note: estimated coeﬃcient from the MLE model. Standard errors (cluster corrected)
within brackets. The model estimates a wage regression (ﬁrst column), a net wage




Employment, Unemployment, and Inactive
Employment Unemployment
Inactive Unemp.










Whole Sample 0.52 0.84 1.36 0.09 –0.84 –0.75 –0.61 –1.23
[0.157] [0.127] [0.232] [0.028] [0.127] [0.121] [0.185] [0.18]
Poor 0.57 0.89 1.45 0.11 –0.89 –0.78 –0.67 -
[0.176] [0.145] [0.260] [0.033] [0.145] [0.139] [0.209]
NonPoor 0.51 0.83 1.34 0.09 –0.83 –0.74 –0.60 -
[0.154] [0.123] [0.227] [0.027] [0.123] [0.118] [0.181]
1st Quintile 0.57 0.89 1.46 0.11 –0.89 –0.78 –0.67 -
[0.175] [0.147] [0.261] [0.033] [0.147] [0.140] [0.209]
2nd Quintile 0.54 0.83 1.41 0.10 -0.83 -0.77 -0.64 -
[0.166] [0.143] [0.250] [0.030] [0.143] [0.137] [0.197]
3rd Quintile 0.55 0.86 1.41 0.10 -0.86 -0.76 -0.65 -
[0.167] [0.135] [0.245] [0.030] [0.135] [0.129] [0.197]
4th Quintile 0.53 0.83 1.36 0.09 -0.83 -0.74 -0.62 -
[0.160] [0.123] [0.233] [0.027] [0.123] [0.117] [0.188]
5th Quintile 0.43 0.74 1.17 0.06 -0.74 -0.68 -0.49 -
[0.148] [0.109] [0.216] [0.021] [0.109] [0.103] [0.118]
Note: the table shows the estimated changes in probabilities of diﬀerent employment status induced by an agricultural
trade liberalization in the North. The Participation Eﬀect is the increase in the probability of labor market participation
induced by higher market wages. The Job Oﬀer Eﬀect is the increase in job oﬀers brought about by higher agricultural
prices. The impact on the probability of employment is equal to the changes in the probabilities of unemployment and of
Inactive. Standard Errors of the changes in these probabilities are reported within squared brackets.
The ‘Poor’ is the set of households with a (per equivalent adult) income below the poverty line. The quintiles refer to
household per equivalent adult income as well.
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Whole Sample 7.45 2.94 10.39
[1.30] [0.15] [1.32]
Poor 7.53 2.55 10.08
[1.42] [0.14] [1.42]
NonPoor 7.43 3.04 10.47
[1.29] [0.16] [1.31]
1st Quintile 7.51 2.56 10.07
[1.41] [0.14] [1.42]
2nd Quintile 7.62 2.80 10.42
[1.39] [0.16] [1.39]
3rd Quintile 7.66 2.85 10.51
[1.37] [0.16] [1.38]
4th Quintile 7.54 3.02 10.56
[1.33] [0.16] [1.35]
5th Quintile 6.92 3.50 10.42
[1.28] [0.22] [1.31]
Note: the table shows the estimated change in the expected labor
income of Argentine households. The Employment Probability Eﬀect
is the change in the expected wages arising from a higher probability
of getting a job. The Wage Eﬀect is the change in expected labor
income due to a higher induced wage. Standard Errors (estimated with
bootstrap methods) are reported within squared brackets.
The ‘Poor’ is the set of households with a (per equivalent adult) income
below the poverty line. The quintiles refer to household per equivalent
adult income as well.
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